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 Estimates of Labour Demand 
Elasticities and Elasticities of 
Substitution using Firm-Level 
Manufacturing Data 
Abstract 
Using firm-level manufacturing data supplemented with wages from household 
survey data, this paper estimates translog cost functions to calculate labour 
demand elasticities and Allen Elasticities of Substitution between capital and 
four occupation types. It finds that own-price labour demand elasticities range 
from ￿0.56 to ￿0.8, that capital and all occupation types are substitutes and that 
most occupation types are themselves complements.  
1. Introduction 
The purpose of this paper is to estimate the Allen Elasticities of Substitution 
(AES) between various labour inputs as well as cross- and own-price elasticities 
of labour demand. Such elasticities are measured between capital and labour 
inputs disaggregated according to skill. While skill can be defined by education 
level, this study divides the workforce into four occupations ￿ 
managerial/professional, skilled/artisan, semi-skilled and unskilled. 
For South Africa, no documented empirical measures exist at this level of 
disaggregation, using firm-level data, and/or using an appropriate technological 
representation. There are, however, studies of somewhat disaggregated labour 
elasticities. Moolman (2003) attempts industry-level demand estimations for 
skilled and unskilled labour, but the equations are rudimentary and the wage 
variables are aggregated across skill/occupation types. Du Toit and Koekemoer 
(2003) estimate macroeconomic models for skilled and unskilled labour demand 
and supply based on a Cobb Douglas technology. Edwards (2003, 2002) uses 
firm-level manufacturing data from Gauteng to estimate relative demand 
functions for two occupations using Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES) 
production technologies.  2 
 
Cobb Douglas technologies are inappropriate because they assume the AES is 
unity, while CES functions are not easily conducive to multiple factors and also 
impose various technological restrictions on the technology and elasticities 
(Heathfield and Wibe, 1987). Translog functions can overcome these 
disadvantages. This paper therefore estimates a translog cost function to derive 
the AES and factor demand elasticities. 
It employs national firm-level manufacturing data, which unfortunately does not 
contain wages. Therefore, household data are used to predict wages for each 
firm according to characteristics that are common to both the firm and 
household surveys, after which the wages are adjusted for firm-size effects.  
The AES estimates suggest capital and all forms of labour are substitutes and 
offer no evidence of capital-skill complementarity. Managerial/Professional 
labour and other occupations are complements. Unskilled workers and 
skilled/artisan workers are substitutes but unskilled workers and semi-skilled 
workers are complements. Unlike other studies, this paper can indicate to what 
extent these results hold across the entire sample. Own-price elasticities are ￿
0.56 for managerial/professional and skilled/artisan occupations, ￿0.65 for 
unskilled workers and ￿0.8 for semi-skilled employees.  
In arriving at these results, this paper motivates why estimating translog cost 
functions is the most appropriate for deriving substitution elasticities in section 
2. Section 3 discusses the estimation process and inference options. Section 4 
discusses the data, in particular the process by which wages are constructed 
using household data. Section 5 shows analytically the potential pitfalls of not 
accounting for firm-size in wage construction before adjusting wages using an 
existing estimate of firm-size effects on wages. Section 6 contains the results 
and section 7 provides some brief concluding commentary. 
2. Elasticities of Substitution and Factor 
Demand 
Robinson (1933) proposed the Elasticity of Substitution between two factors: 


















=        ( 1 )  
xi and xj are factors i and j while qi and qj are the first derivatives of output with 
respect to factors i and j. On the assumption that the factor price equals marginal 3 
 
product, this can be interpreted as the percentage change in the ratio of factor 
quantities in response to a one percent change in the ratio of factor prices. 
In a multiple factor setting, Allen (1938) proposes the (partial) Elasticity of 
Substitution (AES) between 2 factors, holding output and other factor prices 
constant. Using a production function and the system of first order conditions 
for the cost-minimising factor demands, he defines the AES between factors i 
and j as: 










      ( 2 )  
q is the determinant of the bordered Hessian of equilibrium conditions and  ij q is 
the cofactor of qij in q. By Euler￿s theorem, the summation term equals q under 
constant returns to scale.  
The AES as expressed in equation 2 imposes a cumbersome calculation, but 
Uzawa (1962) uses the duality between production and cost functions to show 
that equation 2 can be replaced by: 






σσ ≡=       ( 3 )  
Uzawa￿s proof employs a unit cost function, which only uniquely represents the 
underlying production function under constant returns to scale (Varian, 1992). 
His result thus appears strictly applicable to constant returns to scale only. 
However, countless studies use this result in more general settings. For example, 
of the twelve listed in Chung (1994), only five have a linearly homogenous 
production technology. While the validity of equation 3 under more general 
technological settings may be ￿folk knowledge￿, it is instructive to confirm and 
document this. Appendix 1 shows the duality result indeed holds without the 
requirement of constant returns to scale.  
Based on Marshall￿s (1920) rules of labour demand, the relationship between the 
AES and the constant output elasticity of factor demand is: 
      , ij j AES ij s λ σ =        ( 4 )  
λij is the partial elasticity of the quantity of factor i with respect to the price of 
factor j and sj is the cost share of factor j. Heathfield and Wibe (1987) assert the 
relationship between λij and σij holds only under conditions of constant returns to 4 
 
scale. Indeed, they refer to Allen (1938), who in his exposition uses linear 
homogeneity. However, constant returns to scale is not a requirement for this 
result to hold, as shown in appendix 2.  
Equation 4 refers to the constant output elasticity of factor demand. Provided the 
technology is homothetic, one can endogenise profit-maximising output to factor 
prices and allow for so-called scale effects as shown in Fallon and Verry (1988) 
and Mosak (1938). However, because this study uses firm-level data to infer 
industry-level effects, constant returns to scale is required and, as the regression 
in appendix 3 shows, the underlying technology is not homothetic. 
3. Estimating Elasticities using Translog Cost 
Functions 
Binswanger (1974a) lists why cost functions are more popular than production 
functions for estimation purposes. First, as a consequence of optimising 
behaviour, cost functions exhibit homogeneity of degree one in prices, which 
can be imposed to improve estimation efficiency without recourse to 
technological assumptions. Also, cost functions are more consistent with the 
view that wages are exogenous. The main reason, however, for using a cost 
function in this study is that, as shown in section 2, the AES and elasticity of 
factor demand can be far more tractably arrived at than by using production 
functions.  
There are various options for the choice of technological approximation. In a 
macroeconomic model of skilled and unskilled labour demand and supply, Du 
Toit and Koekemoer (2003) use a Cobb Douglas production function. Although 
they claim it was ￿estimated and validated as representative of the South 
African production structure￿ (ibid: 7), the homogeneity and separability 
assumptions it carries are too restrictive to go untested in a new study. More 
importantly, the implication that the Elasticity of Substitution is unity 
completely circumvents one of the aims of this work.  
Constant Elasticity of Substitution functions allow the Elasticity of Substitution 
to differ from one, but the Elasticity of Substitution is the same between all 
input pairs. This is still a major restriction, but the resulting factor demand 
equations yield easily estimable elasticities between two factors. For example, 
Edwards (2003) estimates an equation for the demand for skilled relative to 
unskilled labour (S/U) as a function of relative wages (Ws/Wu), import 
penetration variables (M), export orientation (X), and technology variables (Ф).  5 
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     (5) 
Edwards estimates σ to be ￿0.47 between skilled and unskilled labour and ￿0.41 
between less-skilled and unskilled labour. The values are quite close, suggesting 
the CES restriction is not seriously inaccurate. 
Adding factors requires complex techniques. Fallon and Lucas (1998) include 
capital in their CES function to estimate, with non-linear 3 stage least squares 
and calibration techniques, demand for black and white labour as proxies for 
unskilled and skilled labour. They produce industry-level long run elasticities of 
demand for unskilled labour of about ￿0.7 in manufacturing.   
More flexible functional forms do not impose a priori technological 
assumptions like separability of factor inputs or homotheticity. Besides allowing 
for a potentially more accurate representation of the underlying technology, 
elasticities can vary across the sample. Two functions in this class are the 
Generalised Leontief function due to Diewert (1971, in Berndt, 1991) and the 
transcendental logarithmic (translog) function developed by Christensen, 
Jorgenson and Lau (1973).  
There appears to be no relevant application of either of these to heterogeneous 
labour in the South African literature. This study uses a translog cost function, 
which can be interpreted as second order Taylor Approximations to an unknown 
underlying technology
1:  
                                       
            ( 6 )  
C is cost, wi is the price of factor i, y is output or value added. The cost share 
equation for factor i is derived by differentiating the cost function with respect 
to lnwi . Following Chung (1994): 
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But, where xi is the quantity of factor i and using Shephard￿s Lemma for the 
second equality: 
                                                 
1 In a rare comparison of both technologies, Humphrey and Wolkowitz (1976) obtain 
somewhat different elasticity estimates, so there certainly is merit in comparing this study￿s 
results with those using a Generalised Leontief technology. 
0
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Therefore: 
     ln ln ii i j j i y
j
sa bwb y =+ + ∑       (9) 























           
(10) 
In addition, restrictions can be imposed on the technology. This is easily seen by 
observing that returns to scale are calculated as the inverse of: 
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=== + +∑                (11) 
To get a measure of returns to scale that is independent of the factor prices, as 
implied by homotheticity, requires 0   iy bi = ∀ . If homothetic, the underlying 
technology is homogeneous of degree r if 0 y b = , with 1
y a r = .  
To derive the elasticity of factor demand (λij), observe that: 
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Therefore: 
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Using equation 4, the AES is:  






σ =+                  ( 1 4 )  
bij=0 would yield the Cobb Douglas AES of unity. The own elasticity of factor 
demand in Binswanger (1974a) is: 







λ =+ −                ( 1 5 )  
while the AES is: 







σ =+ −                 ( 1 6 )  
Humphrey and Wolkowitz (1976) suggest the own AES can be interpreted as a 
change in a factor￿s demand responsiveness to a change in its own price.  
The cost share equations (9) will be estimated together with the cost function 
(equation 6) using the Zellner seemingly unrelated regressions (SUR) model, 
which exploits correlations between the errors in each of the share equations to 
improve efficiency. Scope for such gains is limited by the fact that the 
explanatory variables in each factor share equation are identical or at least 
highly correlated. However, cross equation restrictions do allow for efficiency 
improvements (Greene, 2003). Restrictions exist because the cost shares are 
derivatives of the cost function, so some coefficients are the same. Slutsky 
symmetry also implies cross equation restrictions.  
However, the restrictions that ai in the cost equation equal the constant for each 
share equation i  is  not imposed, even if it is supposed to be the same by 
definition This is because the equations may still suffer from measurement error 
and other specification issues. Wooldridge (2002) demonstrates that much of the 
bias of these imperfections is deposited on the constant, so restricting these 
catchments for error would spill the biases throughout the system.  
By construction, the sums of the ai coefficients across the factor share equations 
equal unity for each observation. Therefore, the residual cross product and 
disturbance covariance matrices are singular and prevent estimation (Berndt, 
1991). A common response is to impose price homogeneity on the cost function 
and hence across the share equations. Using the second restriction in (10), 
let 1 kl aa =− ∑ , where k refers to capital and l refers to the four labour inputs. This 8 
 
allows the share equation for capital to be dropped and the remaining four factor 
share equations to be estimated as
2: 
    ln ln ; ( , 1,...,4)
j
i i ij iy
j k
w
sa b b y i j
w
=+ + = ∑        (17) 
The capital equation is dropped but Berndt (1991) shows the choice is arbitrary 
if the Zellner iterated efficient (IZEF) procedure is used. The IZEF procedure is 
the dominant method in the literature and is the one employed by this study: 
instead of one or two-step feasible generalised least squares estimates, the 
procedure iterates over the disturbance covariance matrix and parameter 
estimates until they converge (see Statacorp (2003)). 
Some studies use the estimated coefficients and actual factor shares to calculate 
elasticities in equations 13 to 16 (Chung, 1994), but it is correct to use the 
regression￿s predicted shares (Berndt, 1991). Greene (2003) finds it is typical for 
studies to calculate the shares using mean factor prices and factor quantities, 
presenting a single elasticity based on this point.  
However, this approach fails to exploit one of the advantages of translog 
estimates over other functional forms, namely the variation of elasticity 
estimates across the sample. This paper uses the parameter estimates and the 
attributes of each firm to calculate elasticities for every observation. In addition 
to the median of these elasticity estimates, indications of how elasticities vary 
across the sample are also presented. As an informal method of inference, 
information is provided on whether elasticity estimates have the same sign for 
95% of firms. 
Such an informal method is necessary because significant regression coefficients 
neither imply nor are necessary for significant elasticities (Anderson and 
Thursby, 1986)
 3. The difficulty lies in the fact that the elasticity estimates are 
highly non-linear combinations of the coefficients and data (Greene, 2003). 
Reviews of empirical work make no mention of significance (Chung, 1994; 
Hamermesh, 1993). Some studies do not report confidence intervals for the 
estimators at all (eg Bergstr￿m and Panas (1992); Chung (1987); Teal (2000)). 
Others (eg Binswanger (1974b); Mak (2000)) regard the factor shares as fixed 
                                                 
2 For convenience, the subscripts i,j are retained but now refer to the four labour inputs. wk is 
the cost of capital. 
3 ￿Significant￿ can refer to rejecting a null hypothesis of the elasticity being zero, in which 
case we can be confident the factors are complements or substitutes or can refer to the Cobb-
Douglas elasticity of unity. 9 
 
and treat the bij coefficient as the only one with a confidence interval, incorrectly 
inferring the elasticity significance from a t-statistic.  
Anderson and Thursby (1986) find Allen Elasticities of Substitution 
asymptotically follow the normal or ratio-of-normals distribution only if the 
means of the actual factor shares are used, but this study does not have the 
option to make use of the result as no actual shares are available.  
4. Data Description and Construction 
The core dataset is from the National Enterprise Manufacturing Survey (NE 
survey) covering the period of 1998. After adjusting for non-response and 
outliers, there are about 300 firms with the appropriate variables. Unlike the 
Greater Johannesburg Metropolitan Council Survey (GJMC survey), the NE 
survey is national in coverage.  For a thorough description of the data, see 
Bhorat and Lundall (2002).  
Capital is the first input. In an industry-level study of capital in South Africa, 
Fedderke et. al. (2001) use the following expression: 
     () cr π δτ =−+ +       ( 1 8 )  
Π is the inflation rate and τ is the corporate tax rate. Fedderke et. al. calculate 
industry-level data on depreciation (δ) ranging from 11% to 16%
4. For the 
nominal interest rate (r), they use yields on 10-year government bonds, but I use 
the average prime lending rate.  
Furthermore, the interest rate is adjusted to account for risk. Adjustments range 
from ￿2% for large firms older than 5 years to + 5% for new small firms
5. 
Fedderke et. al. use the nominal corporate tax rate for τ, which was 35% for the 
fiscal year starting early in 1998 (RSA, 1998), but state it would be ideal to have 
the effective rates of taxation by industry as this is another source of divergence 
in costs of capital. Negash (1999) calculates effective tax rates to be about 15% 
below nominal rates for the 1990s, so a 20% average effective rate is applied to 
all firms.   
The four occupation groups are managerial/professional, skilled/artisan 
(technicians, welders), semi-skilled (machinery operators) and unskilled 
                                                 
4 I thank Prof Fedderke for providing this data. 
5 Adding 5% is the standard rule of thumb premium added for new small ventures. 10 
 
(labourers, security guards)
 6. The NE survey does not have wage data. Edwards 
(2003) instruments for wages and other industry specific factors by including 
industry dummies in his labour demand equations, which is inappropriate in a 
study where wages form an integral part.  
However, average wages by industry and occupation can be a good 
approximation to those faced by firms in South Africa. Nattrass (2000) reports 
that the main wage setting institutions are industrial level bargaining councils 
(BC), noting that 65% of manufacturing workers are covered by a BC and 
concluding that extension by the Minister of Labour is at the core of wage 
setting in an industry. Also, Moll (1996) shows how extensions of bargaining 
council agreements leads to convergence in technologies and wages in the 
industry.  
The NE survey shows over 70% of firms are subject to a BC agreement. There is 
therefore support for convergence of wages in industries and justification for 
wages being calculated at a supra-firm level for use in firm-level studies. 
The use of predicted wages for firm-level cost function estimates has 
precedence. Teal (2000) predicts values from earnings functions using a 
matching panel. Classifying workers as skilled or unskilled, he generates firm-
level wages using the human capital characteristics observed in those workers 
sampled for each firm. Adopting a similar approach, this paper uses features 
common to the NE dataset and the 1997 October Household Survey,
7 which has 
3 500 people formally working for somebody else in manufacturing, to estimate 
wages.  
For each occupation, the characteristics available in both data sources are: 
                                                 
6 The sales/clerical occupation is dropped on the assumption of separability. Of all the factors, 
this is the one that one should be most comfortable assuming separability for. It is hard to 
believe that the number of salespeople or clerks a company employs will have any impact on 
the relationship between other factors, especially the production workers on the factory floor. 
The motivation behind dropping sales/clerical is poor specification and misleading results. 
The sales/clerical own-price elasticity is persistently positive in systems estimations, which 
show evidence of a poorly specified sales/clerical equation. Part of the reason for the bad 
specification is that this is quite a diverse group in terms of skill-level, so wages are more 
likely to be inaccurate in this occupation. Also, the responsibilities of this diverse group vary 
more than usual across firms, so the control variables are less able to refine this role. 
Furthermore, in systems estimation, errors in one equation can transmit themselves to other 
parts of the system. Therefore, the damage to other results from including the sales/clerical 
occupation is most likely greater than any damage from excluding it. 
7 The 1998 survey was much smaller due to funding problems. This and an allowance for 
adjustment lags make the 1997 survey the preferred edition. Inflationary increases are easily 
dealt with. 11 
 
•  economic activity (broken down into nine industries); 
•  province group (the nine provinces were ex post broken down into two 
groups with similar wages); 
•  individual trade union membership (household data); collective 
bargaining and bargaining council membership (firm data). 
Wage construction entails calculating the survey-adjusted means for selected 
groupings of people for each occupation. This paper accounts for probability 
weights and clustering but only partially adjusts for stratification. The reason for 
this is that many magisterial districts (strata) have only one cluster ￿ many have 
only one observation ￿ and at least two are needed for variance estimates. 
Therefore, compromise stratification by province, which sometimes has close to 
100 magisterial districts, is carried out.  A variety of wage series were initially 
constructed, differing in the degree of disaggregation
8.  
Estimating the most highly disaggregated wage is not optimal, as many 
estimates would come from as few as one observation. The variance on these 
estimates would be very wide (or undefined). Recognising the trade-off between 
heterogeneity and precision, there is therefore a need to aggregate certain 
groups. The aim is to produce a set of estimates with better precision 
characteristics but sufficient variation to represent the firm-level wages. To do 
this, various combinations are carefully inspected. Factors considered are 
differences in log wages, the number of observations, and comparisons of the 
confidence intervals of the separate and combined groups.  
Comparing the confidence intervals of two groups is naturally akin to 
performing a two-sample t-test. However, visual inspection is quicker for all the 
combinations and allows for analysis in conjunction with the other criteria. The 
choice of confidence interval is a matter of taste in this application, so 85% 
bands are used. As a control against this judgement-based procedure, standard t-
tests, regressions and non-parametric procedures are performed on certain 
groups
9. 
It is perhaps easiest to elaborate with an example. Table 1 presents six of the 
fifteen groups the skilled/artisan wages are divided into and the associated 
estimates. 
                                                 
8 Data on wages classified only by industry are available at 
http://www.nuff.ox.ac.uk/users/Behar/data/wage1data.xls.  All wage series were used in 
estimates to gauge robustness. 
9 These include tests of median equality, Anova and Scheffe￿s method of comparing the 
means of each group to those of all the others, but there is no readily available way to adjust 
for survey design. The results do not suggest material differences in classification. 12 
 
EXAMPLE OF WAGE CLASSIFICATIONS 
Table 1: Example of Wage Classifications 
Mean Monthly Salary  Skilled/Artisan  
Estimate Std  Error 
Food & Beverages  1562 161 
Wood, Pulp & Paper - Prov0  1116 229 
Wood, Pulp & Paper - Prov1  1993 169 
Chemicals, Rubber & Plastic - Prov0, not unionised  786 152 
Chemicals, Rubber & Plastic - Prov0,  unionised  2316 264 
Chemicals, Rubber & Plastic - Prov1  2067 284 
The first row contains wages for all skilled/artisans in the Food and Beverages 
industry, regardless of location or union membership.  The Wood Pulp and 
Paper industry is subdivided by province group but not union membership (rows 
2 and 3). Wages in the Chemicals, Rubber and Plastic industries are subdivided 
by province group. One group of provinces is further divided into unionised and 
non-unionised workers (rows 4 and 5) while the other group is not (row 6).  
After adjusting for firm size, as discussed in section 5, wages are also used to 
determine cost shares and total costs. The vast majority of studies, including but 
not restricted to Berndt and Christensen (1973), Teal (2000) and Bergstr￿m and 
Panas (1992), derive total cost and/or factor cost shares using factor price and 
quantity data. Similarly, labour costs are obtained by multiplying labour 
quantities by the constructed wage. Capital costs are the cost of capital 
percentage multiplied by the capacity-adjusted capital stock. Total factor cost 
(Cf) is the sum of factor costs and is the dependent variable in the cost function. 
Two other variables found in cost functions are raw materials and value added. 
Although the NE survey does not contain total costs and does not contain raw 
materials costs, it does contain information on raw materials as a percentage of 
total costs. It also does not have information on value added but does have 
turnover.  
It is possible to build an adequate proxy for value added by multiplying raw 
materials as a percentage of total costs (p) by turnover (y). This works on the 
perfectly competitive assumption that turnover equals total costs including 
opportunity costs.  
Value added can alternatively be constructed using the predicted factor costs. 
Total input cost (Ci), including raw materials, is calculated as
1
f C
p i C − = . Raw 13 
 
materials costs (rm) are easily calculated using Ci and Cf and subtracted from 
output to get a measure of value added. Table 2 considers this value added 
measure (V2) and compares it with the value added measure calculated by 
multiplying p by turnover (V1).  
Table 2: Comparison of value added measures in R million 
Statistic V1=py V2=y-rm 
mean 8  8.71 
1
st quartile  1.2  0.77 
Median 2.8  3.21 
3
rd quartile  8.75  9.63 
Note: The first column uses data on raw material cost percentages and turnover. The second 
uses data on raw material cost percentages, factor prices and quantities. 
The measures of central tendency are close but there is moderate dispersion at 
the 25
th and 75
th percentiles. The correlation between the first measure and the 
wage-based measures is 0.9. The similarities are considerable in spite of the 
completely different calculations, so there are grounds for confidence in the 
constructed data. 
In cost estimations, V2 would introduce very serious correlation with the 
dependent variable, which was constructed using the exact same factor prices 
and quantities. V2 would also be highly correlated with the other inputs. 
Therefore, while useful for comparison with V1, V2 is not used in regressions. 
V1 is used in the cost function.  
The dataset is a single cross section, so variables are required to control for firm-
specific effects and avoid omitted variable bias. Fortunately, the NE dataset has 
a rich set of variables for the purpose.  
5. Accounting for Firm Size Effects on Wages 
Oi and Idson (1999) review the evidence for firm-specific effects on wages, 
especially firm size effects. Possible reasons are that workers are more 
productive because of their education, abilities or the higher capital:labour ratio 
or that they receive compensating differentials for a less-pleasant environment. 
The cost of capital a firm gets tends to fall as it gets bigger, certainly up to a 
point, because small and/or young firms incur risk premia.  14 
 
The following paragraphs analyse what impact ignoring this effect may have on 
translog estimates, showing that the estimations are more likely to (falsely) 
reject homothetic technology and linear price homogeneity and overstate returns 
to scale. Abstracting from individuals￿ characteristics, wages for occupation i 
can be seen as a simple function of firm size measured according to sales (y) and 
a vector of those variables available from the household survey (x). 
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Estimating a translog cost function without accounting for firm size is the same 
as estimating: 
2 1
ln ln ln ln ln ln ln ln , where
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The coefficients containing value added may be vastly different to what they are 
supposed to be. Furthermore, on the assumption that linear price homogeneity 
and constant returns to scale 1; 0; 0; 1 ii j i j i y y y y
ii j
ab b b b a

= == = = = 
 ∑∑ ∑ are valid for 
the true cost function: 
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ab b γ γγ γ ′′ ′ Γ= + Φ= Ω= ∑∑ ∑ ∑ ∑      (21) 
We can￿t be sure 1 ′ Γ>, Varian (1992) shows it is not necessarily the case that all 
ai >0 in translog functions. However, linearly homogeneous prices imply that, if 
all the values of γi for each occupation are close enough to the average across 
occupations, the result will tend to be an upward bias on the value added 
coefficient. If the firm size effect is equal for all occupations, the bias is γ.  
If there is an equal firm size effect, price homogeneity implies  ′ Φ  is zero. If the 
firm-size effect is not equal for each occupation, there is the possibility of 
′ Φ being found significant when it actually is not. This would falsely reject a 
homogeneous technology. Similar analysis concludes the coefficient on  ′ Ω may 
be found significant and therefore falsely reject homotheticity or that linear price 
homogeneity is rejected by distorted coefficient values. 
To understand the likely effects on returns to scale, assume for simplicity a 
common firm-size effect across all occupations. The assumption of a 15 
 
homogeneous technology is relaxed but homotheticity and price homogeneity 
are maintained. Returns to scale are given by: 
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     ( 2 2 )  
Using these assumptions, one can gauge that omitting the firm size variable will 
underestimate the denominator by γ on average, so returns to scale will be 
overestimated. This is intuitive: if wages rise for bigger firms, the returns to 
scale are less than otherwise. Therefore, including a measure of γ will reduce the 
estimated returns to scale.  
Given the possibly severe problems with ignoring firm-size effects, ways of 
capturing them must be found. There is unfortunately no information on the size 
of the firms that individuals in the household survey work for. One way to 
proceed is to attach previously estimated values of γi to the wage series. Bhorat 
and Lundall (2002) estimate the following manufacturing firm-size wage effects 
for the Gauteng Province. 
Table 3: Estimates used to infer firm-size effects 
Managers Professional 
& Technical 
Clerks Sales  & 
Clerical
Craft Operators Labourers Total
0.089 0.076 0.09  0.066  0.096 0.094  0.031 0.065
Note: All except Labourers were significant. 
Their estimates are parsimonious, using only average firm wages and annual 
firm sales, but they are similar to the US study of Doms, Dunne and Troske 
(1997). Assuming the unadjusted wages represent those for an average-sized 
firm, the wage series is inflated/deflated accordingly after adjusting the estimates 
to match the NE survey occupations.  
6. Cost Function and Cost Share Estimations 
Because they are not of direct interest, the full regression results are shown in 
appendix 3. A Wald Test rejects homotheticity at 1%. There are two possible 
explanations for this. One is that the wage data are still not accurate enough and 
poor data are causing false rejections of homotheticity. For example, the firm 16 
 
size effect could be bigger than allowed for
10. Another explanation is that factor 
shares are truly a function of output. For example, bigger firms have cheaper 
and easier access to capital and therefore employ more capital relative to labour. 
It could also be a genuine technological feature, driven by the relationship 
between firm size and manufacturing industry type. If the technology as implied 
by the cost function is heterothetic, this vindicates the use of translog functions 
instead of more restricted functional forms. 
The AES are presented in table 4. Values marked with an asterisk are 
consistently signed across at least 95% of the sample; the other values are 
consistent across at least 75% of the sample.  
Table 4: Allen Elasticities of Substitution (percentage change in the ratio 
of factor quantities in response to exogenous change of 1% in relative 
factor prices) 
σij = σji            j       
   Capital Man/Prof Skil/Art Semi Un
 Capital  -1.62* 2.19* 2.91* 2.73*  1.74*
 Man/Prof  2.19*  -5.96 -5.77 -1.46  -2.04
i  Skil/Art  2.91*  -5.77 -7.53 -7.28*  1.79*
 Semi  2.73*  -1.46 -7.28* -5.48*  -2.44*
 Un 1.74*  -2.04 1.79* -2.44*  -5.94*
Note: *denotes consistent across 5th and 95th percentiles; all others are consistent across both 
quartiles. 
For example, a 1% rise in unskilled wages relative to semi-skilled wages will 
lead to a 2.44% fall in the ratio of unskilled to semi-skilled employment. 
Adopting the terminology in Hamermesh (1993), if a rise in the price of one 
factor leads to a fall in the quantity of another, as measured by the elasticity of 
factor demand, the pair are said to be p-complements. If a rise in the price of one 
factor leads to rise in the quantity of another, the pair are said to be p-
substitutes
11. The elasticity estimates produce the following results: 
•  Capital and all occupations are p-substitutes. 
•  Managerial/professional labour and all other occupations are p-complements. 
                                                 
10 Regressions run without firm-size adjusted wages are available on request. These produced 
nonsensical results including estimates inconsistent with cost minimising behaviour, leading 
to positive own-price elasticities and poorly fitting equations. 
11 This contrasts with q-complements and q-substitutes, which he applies in the context of the 
effects of exogenous changes in one factor￿s quantity on another factor￿s price. 17 
 
•  Skilled/artisan occupations are p-complements with managers/professionals 
and semi-skilled workers but they are p-substitutes with unskilled labour. 
•  Semi-skilled workers and all other occupations are p-complements. 
•  Unskilled workers are p-complements with managers/professionals and semi-
skilled workers but p-substitutes with skilled/artisan labour. 
Table 5 presents the own- and cross-price elasticities of factor demand. 
Table 5: Elasticities of factor demand (% change in quantity of factor i in 
response to a 1% change in the price of factor j) 
λij           j       
   Capital  Man/Prof  Skil/Art  Semi  Un 
 Capital  -0.96*  0.18*  0.18*  0.40*  0.19* 
 Man/Prof  1.28*  -0.56  -0.32*  -0.20  -0.20 
i  Skil/Art  1.77*  -0.42*  -0.56  -0.99*  0.19* 
 Semi  1.60*  -0.12*  -0.43*  -0.80*  -0.26* 
 Un  1.03*  -0.16*  0.12*  -0.34*  -0.65* 
Note: * denotes consistent across 95% of firms; all other values are consistent across 75% of 
firms. 
All own-price elasticities are close to the ￿0.66 to ￿0.85 range found in most 
South African studies (see Nattrass (2004)). In particular, we can say that, based 
on firm-level manufacturing evidence, a 10% fall in unskilled wages should lead 
to a 6.5% rise in unskilled employment, holding output constant. A 10% fall in 
skilled/artisan wages will lead to a 1.2% fall in unskilled employment while the 
same fall in semi-skilled wages would lead to a 3.4% rise in unskilled 
employment. This demonstrates the value of disaggregation. 
7. Concluding Comments 
The survey year was a year of recession, which perhaps distorts the production 
relations between the factors. Moreover, much restructuring took place in the 
early 1990s and has continued since the sample period, meaning the nature of 
technological relationships may already have changed since then.  
Nonetheless, the AES involving capital offer no support for the capital skill 
complementarity (CSC) hypothesis. Due to Griliches (1969), the CSC 
hypothesis is that capital is relatively more complementary to skilled labour than 
to unskilled labour. The weak form requires that capital and unskilled labour are 18 
 
more substitutable than capital and more skilled labour, but this is clearly not the 
case. 
The fact that all forms of labour seem roughly equally substitutable for capital 
suggests capital is separable from the labour inputs (see Sato (1975)). This has 
two methodological implications. First, studies of labour/capital substitution 
would not incur a great cost by aggregating various forms of heterogeneous 
labour. Second, should data constraints prevent the use of costs of capital in 
studies of intra-labour elasticities, omitting capital would not affect the estimates 
badly.  
Most occupations share a common substitute ￿ capital ￿ but are themselves p-
complements. This result is important, and differs from two-factor studies, 
which by construction will find skilled and unskilled labour to be substitutes. 
While the previous paragraph suggested simplifications to the model need not be 
damaging in some applications, only using two factors can be very misleading in 
others. 
Furthermore, the values imply that wage restraint in one occupation, by allowing 
relative wages to fall relative to the cost of capital, would increase employment 
of that occupation and the other occupations. There are therefore gains from co-
ordination in wage setting between occupation groups (as opposed to co-
ordination between industries). This may be a reason why unions within an 
industry tend to represent more than one occupation on the skill spectrum and 
tend to bargain for wages at all levels simultaneously. Given the 
complementarity between occupation types and the apparent opportunities for 
co-ordination, there are clear grounds for research into the interactions between 
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Appendix 1: Proof that Uzawa result holds under 
general technological conditions 
 
The conditional factor demands are derived from the cost minimisation 
problem
12: 
    1 min   subject to  ( ,..., ) ii n
i
wx q x x y = ∑     (23) 
The first order conditions are, where ￿ is the Lagrange multiplier: 
    













     ( 2 4 )  
The cost function is: 
    11 ( ,..., , ) ( ,..., , ) ni i n
i
Cw w y w xw w y =∑         (25) 
Following Allen (1938), but without assuming constant returns to scale, 
differentiate the first-order conditions with respect to wi , divide each equation 
by ￿ and define 
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12 I am particularly grateful to Dr Margaret Stevens for her role in establishing this result.  23 
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Therefore: 










       ( 2 8 )  
where, as in equation 2, q is the determinant of the bordered Hessian of 
equilibrium conditions and  ij q is the cofactor of qij in q. Using equation 2: 
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But: 
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(by the first order conditions) and 
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(by Shephard￿s Lemma), so: 
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Appendix 2: Proof that the link between AES and 
demand elasticities hold under general 
technological conditions: 
 
Using (29) to (31): 
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,12
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But:  
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Therefore: 
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Appendix 3: Regression used as basis for final cost 
function elasticity results 
Estimation method: Seemingly Unrelated Regression using Iterated Zellner Efficient Method 
with cost minimisation restrictions imposed (see equation 10).  
Summary diagnostics for each equation 
Equation Obs  RMSE  "R-sq"  chi2  P 
Man/Prof 307  0.06  0.43  232.62  0 
Skilart 307  0.08  0.18  71.78  0 
Semi 307  0.13  0.16  61.78  0 
Un 307  0.11  0.11  38.65  0.02 
Cost 307  0.54  0.85  2021.29  0 
Note: Wald Test for homotheticity: Chi
2
5 = 16.01; p=0.0068. 
 
Cost Equation  Coeff  p  ind2 0.196  0.406 
Capital 0.245  0.733  ind3  0.496  0.046 
ManProf 0.266  0.442  ind4  -0.249  0.186 
SkilArt 0.079  0.718  ind5  -0.053  0.793 
Semi 0.165  0.727  ind6  0.418  0.15 
Un 0.245  0.374  ind7  0.110  0.631 
0.5*Capital^2 -0.326  0.07  ind8  0.065  0.81 
Capital*ManProf 0.057  0.277  ind9  -0.313  0.048 
Capital*SkilArt 0.074  0.195  loc2  0.214  0.428 
Capital*Semi 0.148  0.171  loc3  -0.334  0.08 
Capital*Un 0.047  0.479  loc4  -0.292  0.122 
0.5*ManProf^2 0.029  0.413  loc5  -0.746  0.003 
ManProf*SkilArt -0.032  0.079  loc6  0.740  0.079 
ManProf*Semi -0.030  0.426  loc7  0.703  0.043 
ManProf*Un -0.025  0.344  loc8  -0.231  0.578 
0.5*Skilart^2 0.024  0.372  loc9  -0.290  0.113 
SkilArt*Semi  -0.071  0.049  exports as % sales  0.235  0.246 
SkilArt*Un  0.005  0.844  raw materials as % costs  0.006  0 
0.5*Semi^2  0.007  0.94  imports as % raw materials  -0.001  0.466 
Semi*Un -0.054  0.255  equipment  age 0.008  0.106 
Un^2  0.027  0.575  Recruitment ease ManProf  0.100  0.05 
Value Added  0.294  0  Recruitment ease SaleCle  -0.054  0.232 
0.5*(Value Added)^2  0.129  0  Recruitment ease Skilart  -0.066  0.106 
(Value Added)*Cap  0.005  0.778  Recruitment ease Semi  0.010  0.817 
(Value 
Added)*ManProf -0.018  0.002  Recruitment  ease  Un  0.015  0.807 
(Value Added)*Skilart  0.000  0.96  Productivity dissatisfaction  0.052  0.023 
(Value Added)*Semi  0.010  0.433  Training expenditure  0.000  0.013 
(Value Added)*Un  0.002  0.76  Market conditions  -0.010  0.173 
      Firm size > 50 employees  0.371  0 
     ownermanaged  -0.613  0 
     CollectiveBargaining  0.003  0.962 
     Firm  age  0.044  0.09 
     klratio 1.404  0 
    
Computer Investment as % 
Assets -3.334  0 
     _cons  4.107  0.044 
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The CSSR is an umbrella organisation comprising five units:  
 
The Aids and Society Research Unit (ASRU) supports quantitative 
and qualitative research into the social and economic impact of 
the HIV pandemic in Southern Africa.  Focus areas include:  the 
economics of reducing mother to child transmission of HIV, the 
impact of HIV on firms and households; and psychological 
aspects of HIV infection and prevention.  ASRU operates an 
outreach programme in Khayelitsha (the Memory Box Project) 
which provides training and counselling for HIV positive people 
 
The Data First Resource Unit (‘Data First’) provides training and 
resources for research.  Its main functions are: 1) to provide 
access to digital data resources and specialised published 
material; 2) to facilitate the collection, exchange and use of data 
sets on a collaborative basis; 3) to provide basic and advanced 
training in data analysis; 4) the ongoing development of a web 
site to disseminate data and research output.    
 
The Democracy in Africa Research Unit (DARU) supports students 
and scholars who conduct systematic research in the following 
three areas:  1) public opinion and political culture in Africa and 
its role in democratisation and consolidation; 2) elections and 
voting in Africa; and 3) the impact of the HIV/AIDS pandemic on 
democratisation in Southern Africa. DARU has developed close 
working relationships with projects such as the Afrobarometer (a 
cross national survey of public opinion in fifteen African countries), 
the Comparative National Elections Project, and the Health 
Economics and AIDS Research Unit at the University of Natal. 
 
The Social Surveys Unit (SSU) promotes critical analysis of the 
methodology, ethics and results of South African social science 
research. One core activity is the Cape Area Panel Study of 
young adults in Cape Town.  This study follows 4800 young people 
as they move from school into the labour market and adulthood.  
The SSU is also planning a survey for 2004 on aspects of social 
capital, crime, and attitudes toward inequality. 
 
The Southern Africa Labour and Development Research Unit 
(SALDRU) was established in 1975 as part of the School of 
Economics and joined the CSSR in 2002.  SALDRU conducted the 
first national household survey in 1993 (the Project for Statistics on 
Living Standards and Development).  More recently, SALDRU ran 
the Langeberg Integrated Family survey (1999) and the 
Khayelitsha/Mitchell’s Plain Survey (2000).  Current projects 
include research on public works programmes, poverty and 
inequality.  
 
 
 